God, pilgrimage, and acknowledgement of place by Wynn, Mark
God, pilgrimage, and acknowledgement of place
MARK WYNN
Department of Theology, University of Exeter, Amory Building, Rennes Drive,
Exeter, EX4 4RJ
Abstract: The paper seeks to address three objections to pilgrimage
practices – they are tied to superstitious beliefs (except where they are seen as
simply an aid to the imagination), imply a crude experiential or emotional
understanding of the nature of faith, and rest upon a primitive conception of
divine localizability. In responding to these objections, I argue that the religious
significance of places is not reducible to their contribution to religious imagination,
experience or understanding. In this sense, relationship to God is not just a matter
of thought, but of location.
Introduction
It is obvious enough that religious believers often take particular places to
be especially favourable for worship, religious experience, or the founding and
consolidation of religious identity. In this sense the activities of the faithful tend
to be at least somewhat place-specific. Despite the obviousness of this truth from
a sociological or anthropological point of view, it has not received much attention
in the philosophy of religion literature.1
In this paper I want to consider pilgrimage as one example of this broader
phenomenon. Pilgrimage practices have had a central part to play in all of
the major faith traditions.2 They have also proved to be an enduring source of
theological controversy – a controversy which has embroiled even some of the
founding figures of these traditions.3 One familiar line of objection maintains that
such practices are inevitably bound up with a primitive conception of God: it may
be thought, for example, that they are implicated in a crude idea of divine local-
izability, or that they depend for their point upon superstitious beliefs concern-
ing, for instance, miracles of healing. On the other side, and precisely in order to
accommodate such concerns, proponents of pilgrimage have sometimes sought
to understand its point in broadly naturalistic terms – thinking of pilgrimage as,
for example, simply an aid to the religious imagination.4
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In this paper, I shall try to map out a kind of middle ground in this debate – one
which supposes that pilgrimage practices do not depend for their point upon
‘superstitious’ beliefs but that, even so, their sense cannot be adequately
specified in purely naturalistic terms. A unifying theme in the paper will be the
idea that the religious significance of places is not to be characterized simply in
epistemic or experiential terms5 – so, negatively, I argue in turn that: (1) the
religious importance of places is not just a matter of their ability to bring the
believer to a more vivid imagining of biblical or other scenes; (2) nor is it a matter
of their ability to bring the believer to a deeper or livelier experience of God; and
(3) neither is the significance of place reducible to the contribution of certain
events or people in revealing God with special clarity. Positively, I argue that
pilgrimage is a matter of encountering certain meanings, by placing oneself in
a relevant relationship of physical proximity, and is a matter of achieving an
embodied reference to God (one which is not mediated simply by experience or
description of God). For simplicity’s sake, I am going to concentrate on the case of
theistic religion, and the Christian faith in particular.
Some cases cognate with pilgrimage
Of course, the motivations of pilgrims are various, and sometimes rather
unedifying. But part of what is involved in pilgrimage is, I take it, the idea that the
relationship of physical proximity can be religiously important. It may be for
example that the pilgrim wishes to touch some relic, or wishes to stand on the
ground where a martyr perished, or where a body is interred, or where a vision
took place. So we might begin by asking: how might a relationship of physical
proximity be religiously significant? Rather than examining the religious case
directly, I want to approach this question by starting with two other cases – which
I shall argue are analogous to the religious case – where physical proximity or
some kindred relationship seems important in providing access to or conserving
a certain kind of meaning or significance.
It is, of course, common practice to visit the grave of deceased friends or
relations. On one natural account, presence at the graveside provides an occasion
to recall the deceased person, and to rehearse various thoughts about her. And no
doubt this is part of what is involved: standing at the graveside, one’s thoughts
are naturally drawn to the person buried there; and accordingly, visiting the grave
may serve as a stimulus to thought about her. But in many cases anyway, we find
more significance in visiting a grave than this. After all, if the point of the practice
were simply to stimulate thought about the person, then that end could be
achieved as readily, in the normal case, by examining a photograph of her, or by
some other means which does not require the labour of a journey to the grave.
Rather, it matters, I suggest, that when we stand at the graveside we are in a
relationship of physical proximity to the body of the deceased person.
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This practice seems to presuppose, therefore, that the significance we associate
with persons can be transmitted in some degree to their bodies post-mortem. Of
course, this is not to say that the post-mortem body bears the same significance
as the living person, just that it has an importance which is broadly ethical –
which derives from the fact that it was once the body of a living person, and which
we might try to articulate by reference to notions such as ‘dignity’ and ‘respect’.
If that is so, then visiting the graveside is not entirely discontinuous from the
practice of visiting the living person: in each case we place ourselves in the
presence of a body, where that body sets a limit on our will (determines, for
example, that certain ways of treating it are inadmissible), because of the dignity
of the person whose body it is. So on this view, something of the respect that was
owed to the living person is owed to their body post-mortem, and accordingly we
may say that the significance of the person is in some degree stored up in their
body post-mortem, and can continue to exercise an ethical claim upon us
through the post-mortem body.
This account suggests that there are two relationships at stake here. First of all,
because it stands in a relationship of physical continuity to the body of the living
person, the post-mortem body can preserve something of the significance of the
person. And secondly, by standing in a relationship of physical proximity to such
a body, I can thereby encounter that significance: in other words, it’s not just that
the relationship of physical proximity helps me to grasp the significance of the
person in thought (it’s not just that I am led to entertain certain thoughts about
the person when I stand at the graveside); rather, the person’s significance is
‘presented’ to me, in so far as the post-mortem body requires of me, when I am in
its presence, a certain kind of practical response (broadly, one of respect).
It is easy to imagine two contrasting reactions to this example, or my
interpretation of it. In a naturalistic spirit, it may be said that this practice has to
be about recollection of the deceased person, on pain of superstition. And on the
other side, it may be said that the practice may, legitimately, involve more than
recollection – and that to allow for this case we need to introduce some meta-
physical hypothesis to explain how it is possible for the significance of the person
to be conserved in some degree in the post-mortem body. Perhaps, it will be said,
the spirit of the person lingers on in his body parts? Against these readings, we
should say once more that the sense in which the significance of the person is
conserved in the post-mortem body is ethical, and not ‘metaphysical ’ or simply
psychological (taking the body as an aid to recollection).
If asked why ethical significance attaches to the post-mortem body, we might
say that there is an important distinction between the person’s body and, say, a
packet of spaghetti that was in his possession at the time of death. This is because
the body is, to say no more, intimately connected to the person’s possibilities for
self-expression: the words and deeds of the person are realized in his bodily
movements. And accordingly the body of a person bears a particularly intimate
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relation to the meaning that is displayed in his life (or may come to be displayed,
to take the case of the children) – both the particular meaning that ensues from
his particular life choices, and the more general meaning that attaches to any life
insofar as it is a human life. Accordingly, the post-mortem body is entitled to a
certain respect for the reason simply that it has been the site for the realization of
this sort of meaning.
We have been considering the practice of visiting a graveside, but of course
similar issues arise in many other cases. Think, for example, of the debate in the
United States concerning the use to which the site of the 9/11 attacks should be
put – and the question of what sort of building, for what sort of purpose, it would
be fitting to place there. This example is rather different from the case of visiting a
grave insofar as it does not involve any thought about the claim made upon us by
the bodies of the victims of the events of 9/11. Here the thought is, rather, that
what has happened in a place can set a constraint on how the place ought to be
treated thereafter. So, as with our first example, it is implied, I suggest, that the
significance we associate with a person can be communicated, in some degree,
post-mortem; only here it is the place that is the bearer of that significance, rather
than the body.
Of course, not any place can bear this sort of importance. To understand this
particular example, we need to grasp that human beings were murdered in the
attack on the World Trade Centre. And in general, we might suppose, a place can
store up in some degree the significance of a person insofar as it had an important
part to play in his or her life story – just as the significance of a person can be
preserved in his or her body because of the body’s importance as the locus of self-
expression. So here too, as with the grave-visiting example, a certain meaning can
be preserved by virtue of the relationship of physical continuity (it matters that
‘Ground Zero’ is physically continuous with the site once occupied by the World
Trade Centre) ; and in turn, by virtue of the relationship of physical proximity, we
can be claimed by that meaning in the present (since the history of the site
sets constraints on how we are to behave towards it, when there in person, or
when determining how it is to be treated by others who will in turn stand in a
relationship of physical proximity to it). The example of the World Trade Centre is
in some ways an unusual case, of course, but there are many more everyday
examples where the same kinds of connection seem to be exemplified. Think, for
instance, of the practice of placing flowers by the roadside at the scene of a fatal
accident. Here too we seem to suppose that a site can acquire an ethical or
existential significance by virtue of its history – and that this significance calls for
acknowledgement in our dealings with the site in the present.
So these various examples all imply, I suggest, that certain kinds of existential
or broadly ethical meaning may be vouchsafed by way of the relationships
of physical continuity and physical proximity. In particular, I have proposed
that bodies and places can be the bearers of this sort of meaning. Let’s think
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now about whether these considerations can help to elucidate the nature of
pilgrimage – for here too, of course, places and bodies are taken to have special
importance.
Pilgrimage, naturalism, and supernaturalism
In the remainder of this paper, I want to examine three objections to
pilgrimage practices, and to consider (especially in relation to the first of these
objections) whether the non-religious cases of meaning-transmission which we
have been discussing suggest a way of meeting these objections.6
I am going to begin with an objection which will sound familiar : it might be
said that pilgrimage is perfectly licit where its object is to stimulate recollection,
but that other kinds of motivation are liable to fall into superstition.7 This sort of
view seems to have been common among Anglican pilgrims visiting Palestine in
the nineteenth century. As Thomas Hummel observes: ‘The English Protestant
pilgrim was for the most part an educated literate person who visited Jerusalem
and the Holy Land in order to vivify the Bible as well as to have the adventure
of visiting an exotic place.’8 For these pilgrims, the religious point of pilgrimage
to the Holy Land was as an aid to the imagination, to enable a more life-like
recollection of scenes from the life of Jesus and other biblical figures. By contrast
with the Russian pilgrims of the period whomHummel also describes, pilgrims of
this persuasion tended to view the Holy Sepulchre, and other such sites, with at
least a degree of reserve. One comments:
… though we cannot be affected by the Holy Sepulchre, as others may, yet when
we think of the thousands who have made this spot the centre of their hopes, and in
a spirit of piety though not untinctured by superstitious feeling of bygone ages,
have endured danger, and toil, and fever, and want to kneel with bursting hearts
upon the sacred rock; then, as regards the history of humanity, we feel that it is
holy ground.9
Interestingly, in this passage, the significance of the Holy Sepulchre site is
considered to be a matter of its history, but of its human history as a focus for
piety, rather than its history in the scheme of salvation. But notwithstanding the
sincerity and depth of feeling of earlier Christian pilgrims, the judgement of this
writer is clearly that their practices were theologically flawed, and he goes on to
comment: ‘For ourselves, we would rather go forth, without the walls, and seek
some solitary spot, and endeavour, with the page of the New Testament before us,
in silence to image forth the awful scene. ’10 So here is a first objection to pil-
grimage: holy places should be regarded fundamentally as an aid to recollection,
as a help to ‘imaging forth’ various biblical scenes, and when considered in other
terms are liable to involve a corruption of genuine faith. The view from which
Anglicans of this persuasion were trying to distance themselves is, I suggest, the
idea that places can be charged with a kind of ‘presence’, and can bear sacred
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significance for this reason. That view would have struck them as ineradicably
superstitious.
What should wemake of this objection? Our earlier discussion suggests, I think,
that the view which Hummel attributes to various nineteenth-century Anglican
pilgrims, or more generally, the view of pilgrimage which we might associate with
a certain kind of ‘ liberal Protestantism’, is excessively ‘naturalistic ’. Our two ex-
amples, of the graveside and the site of the 9/11 attacks, suggest in turn the case
where a pilgrim visits a site because a saintly relic is stored there, and the case
where a site is visited because of some event with which it is associated (where
the event has left no trace in terms of body parts, for example). And just as it is
true that there is more involved, potentially, in the practice of visiting a graveside
than simply recalling the deceased person, without any metaphysical impropriety
thereby being implied, so it is true that there can be more to the practice of
visiting a holy site than simply providing an occasion to rehearse various
thoughts about a saintly person, without the need to have recourse to dubious
metaphysical assumptions.11 And in the same way, just as there can be more to
the thought that the 9/11 site demands a certain kind of respect than simply the
idea that by visiting the site we can ‘revivify’ or recall more vividly various events
from the past, so ‘revivification’ need not exhaust the meaning of the actions of a
pilgrim who visits a site on account of its association with various events of re-
ligious significance (even if those events have left no trace in the form of body
parts, for example).
This is to say, then, that at least one naturalistically inspired account of pil-
grimage practice is too crude. Of course, the practice of the Anglicans who are
described in Hummel’s text is itself recognizably a pilgrimage practice; but it is
one that has, arguably, been distorted by false, naturalizing theory, and accord-
ingly their conception of pilgrimage does not cover the full range of legitimate
possibilities.
We could represent the error of these Anglican pilgrims as a matter of failing to
recognize the possibility of a middle ground between their own position and that
of the Russian pilgrims. In expecting a taper to light miraculously in the tomb of
the Holy Sepulchre on Easter morning, so confirming Jesus’ resurrection, the
Russian pilgrims did, arguably, have a ‘superstitious’ or crudely supernaturalist
view of the significance of this site.12 By contrast, Anglican pilgrims seem to have
thought that if the holy sites in Jerusalem were not to be treated superstitiously,
then it would be necessary to ‘ interiorize’ or psychologize their meaning, and in
this way to make their significance relative to the kinds of reflection that they
might inspire. But our examples suggest another possibility.
When I visit the graveside of a loved one, I gain access to a certain meaning by
placing myself in physical proximity to their body. This is not a purely mentalistic
relation: if, unknown to me, the body of my beloved is not interred there, then
while my presence at this place may still count as an act of paying respect, it will
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not bear the same meaning, because the significance of that person will not
be ‘presented’ to me via the post-mortem body.13 Drawing on this sort of
perspective, we can allow that pilgrimage may involve more than simple recol-
lection, and we can even suppose that certain meanings may be ‘presented’ to us
(where this ‘presentation’ is not reducible to our rehearsing relevant thoughts)
by virtue of our location at a place, without thereby endorsing the understanding
of pilgrimage that is implied in the practice of the Russian pilgrims – whose
devotion seems to have had as its focus allegedly miraculous (in the sense of
natural-law-suspending) events.14
Can this middle ground be adequately characterized in naturalistic terms? That
will depend of course on what kind of ‘naturalism’ is under consideration. The
practice of visiting graves, when interpreted in the way I have suggested, is con-
sistent with what Willem Drees has called the ‘constitutive reductionist ’ strand of
naturalism.15 For example, it does not require us, not without further argument
anyway, to suppose that some non-material entity is resident in the body parts,
enabling those parts to store up in some fashion the significance of the person.
And analogously, we might suppose that the practices of a pilgrim, insofar as she
seeks simply to encounter something of the significance of a holy figure, or of a
certain event, do not require the postulation of anything over and above the bits
of matter which are involved. To put the point in the terms used earlier, this kind
of meaning is mediated by way of the relationships of physical continuity and
physical proximity – and those relationships have to do with the organization of
parts of the physical world. However, it is also true, of course, that the kind of
meaning that is under discussion here is not going to show up in any scientific
examination of the world (of the kind conducted in physics, chemistry, and
biology, for example). And accordingly we should oppose any form of naturalism
which takes the concepts which are required for an understanding of pilgrimage
to be reducible to those which are current in the sciences.
In the concluding phase of this paper, I would like to take note of two further
objections to pilgrimage. These objections, like the first, proceed from the
thought that pilgrimage practices are of dubious rationality – though now the
idea will be that pilgrimage involves an excess of emotion, or that it is implicated
in a primitive conception of God, which fails to reckon with the notion of divine
omnipresence. Again, in discussing these issues, my aim will be to identify a
‘middle ground’ which takes pilgrimage practices to be licit, but not to be wholly
characterizable in (crudely) naturalistic terms, or to be dependent upon (crudely)
supernaturalist claims.
Pilgrimage and referring to a transcendent God
Denys Turner has objected to at least some pilgrimage practices
on the grounds that they are associated with outpourings of emotion,
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and a hankering after a kind of immediate encounter with God. He com-
ments:
We think of personal experience as unmediated by anything so impersonal and
distanced as doctrine. It is the assumption which is contained in that lingering moment
of wishful-thinking which lurks in the thought of how decisive it would have been to
meet the person of the historical Jesus, of how immediately convincing that would have
been by comparison with the historically distanced figure we find in the Scriptures, or in
the doctrinally and theologically mediated reality of the Eucharist or service of prayer. It
is that same wishful-thinking which leads some to be more excited by the witness of the
Shroud of Turin, or the experience of the Holy Places, than by their own, often
uninspiring experience of Christian worship.16
As with the first objection we examined, here the perceived difficulty with
pilgrimage practices is in part their association with states of emotional arousal,
and more generally, for Turner, their association with ‘experience’ (compare
again the reserve of nineteenth-century Anglican pilgrims towards the outpour-
ing of emotion in the Holy Places) – only on Turner’s account, it is liturgy and
doctrine, rather than a revivified reading of the Bible, that is taken to provide the
proper corrective to such sentimentalism. Turner’s comments elsewhere in this
text, and in his other writings, reveal that his stance on this point is bound up
with his apophaticism, which in turn implies a reluctance to see God as captur-
able, or ‘ localizable’, whether in experience or thought or place.17 So we might
summarize this second objection to pilgrimage in these terms: to say no more,
certain pilgrimage practices imply an attachment to ‘experience’ (especially an
attachment to emotionally charged experience) and they fail therefore to recog-
nize that God cannot be encountered as an object of experience, and that the life
of faith is not fundamentally a matter of ‘experience’.18
No doubt pilgrimage practices are sometimes motivated by a desire for
emotional arousal. And in that case they will invite a reductive kind of naturalistic
explanation – for instance, we might see them as generated by a desire for re-
assurance (if such experiences are taken to signify divine favour) or by a desire for
the pleasant or thrilling phenomenological feel of certain kinds of exalted
experience.19 But on another reading, I shall now argue, and precisely contrary to
Turner’s proposal, we could take pilgrimage practices to be a way of making good
deficiencies in our experience of God, or deficiencies in our theoretical account
of God.
Let us suppose (with Turner, but contrary to a broad swathe of recent literature
in the philosophy of religion) that we do not encounter God as a particular object
of experience, and that our understanding of the divine nature is at best partial, if
not flatly mistaken on many points. These assumptions are likely to appeal not
only to those of Turner’s persuasion but also to religious naturalists – naturalists
are of course inclined to locate divine agency in relation to the general structure
of the cosmos, rather than seeing God as directly manifest to believers on
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particular occasions of experience; and in turn, therefore, naturalists may well
doubt whether our mode of access to God is of the kind that would permit a
detailed description of the divine nature.20 Granted these assumptions, common
to Turner and at least some religious naturalists, we might wonder: how are
Christians (for example) to succeed in picking out the Christian God?
One answer would proceed by noting the ways in which, in mundane contexts,
we can refer to things independently of any direct encounter with them, or any
detailed knowledge of their nature. We might recall, for instance, Saul Kripke’s
suggestion that what matters in securing the reference of a name is that the
present user of the name should have received it from earlier speakers, who in
turn will have received it from still earlier speakers – so generating a chain of
transmission which reaches its terminus in some initial moment of dubbing,
when the name was first fixed to a particular individual.21 Or we might note the
thought that earlier and later generations of scientists are able to refer to the same
entities (viruses, atoms, or whatever) not because they associate the same
descriptions with those entities (on the contrary, most likely, their theories will be
in conflict), nor because they have direct experiential encounter with these
entities, but because the same thing is the implied referent of their material
practices: that is, because the bits of matter which scientists of different periods
manipulate, and the ways in which they manipulate those bits of matter, imply
(together with certain minimal descriptions) that they are investigating one and
the same kind of thing.22
Earlier in the paper, we were concerned with cases where existential meaning is
transmitted by means of our practical engagement with the world, rather than in
some purely ‘mentalistic ’ fashion (because the ‘presentation’ of the significance
of a person at a given place is not a matter simply of what we believe about the
place). In these discussions in the philosophy of language, something similar
seems to be in view, insofar as the reference of a name is taken to be established
not (entirely) by way of the beliefs which the speaker holds about the referent,
but by way of the causal connectedness of the speaker to other speakers, or to
relevant bits of matter in an experimental setting.
How might the sort of reference-securing activity described by Kripke, or
implied in scientific practice, be achieved in religious contexts? To find a parallel,
we need of course to find ways in which the believer can insert themselves within
a tradition which traces back to some initial moment of dubbing of the Christian
God (the Kripke model), or ways in which by manipulation of various bits of
matter they can pick out the ultimate referent of their believing. Naturally, I do
not think that pilgrimage practices are indispensable for these purposes, but it is
easy to read them as having a contribution to make on both counts.
By identifying herself physically with figures of exemplary sanctity (that is,
not simply in thought, but by physical proximity to relevant relics or artefacts or,
in general, places), the pilgrim is able to locate herself, tangibly, within the
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Christian tradition. Similarly, David Hunt has commented of early Christian
pilgrims that their practice ‘was an assertion of identity which transplanted
them… temporally backwards into the history of their community – actually, so
it was firmly held, into the presence of the sainted martyr’.23 Here Hunt picks up a
theme we have noted already: that by placing ourselves in the presence of the
post-mortem body, we can in a sense encounter the significance of the historical
person.24 And he connects this theme, I take it, with the idea that pilgrimage can
function as ‘an assertion of identity’. To put the point in other terms, we might
say that by identifying herself, practically or tangibly, with an individual of
paradigmatic Christian status, the pilgrim is thereby able to denominate herself
as a Christian. So by placing herself in the ‘presence’ of the saint, the pilgrim
locates herself within the wider Christian community. And thereby she achieves
an indirect connection to the event of naming that stands at the source of that
community – in rather the way, we might suppose, that the speaker in Kripke’s
analysis picks out the referent of a name by locating themselves within the
community which has handed on that name.25
Turning to the second of our models of reference (deriving from the case of
reference in science), we might suppose similarly that by engaging with bits of
matter in the ways that are characteristic of pilgrimage (by placing herself in
proximity to relics, or handling sacred artefacts, or just standing at the site of
certain events), the pilgrim can succeed in picking out the ultimate object of her
believing, insofar as it is God who was manifest in the life of the saint whose
bones are preserved here, or who was at work in certain events of religious
significance that occurred here – and it is therefore to God that the pilgrim
ultimately directs herself when she performs these various gestures. Analogously,
an early investigator of viruses, who has a thoroughly imperfect notion of
their nature, may nonetheless succeed in referring to viruses in so far as his
practical activities contextually imply that it is viruses that are the focus of his
enquiries – since it is viruses, rather than some other entity, which are manifest in
the phenomena to which he is attending.
It may be objected that there is a crucial difference between the scientific and
religious case which this account has overlooked.26 The scientist and the pilgrim
alike, it may be said, require someminimal (and truthful) account of the reality to
which their gestures or enquiries are directed. (For example, if the scientist takes
the focus of his enquiries to be not some minute material entity but a variety of
blue cheese, then it is difficult to see how we could intelligibly suppose that really
it is viruses which are the object of his enquiries.) But while it is easy enough to
allow that the scientist may have some minimal description of the nature of
viruses which is not of itself sufficient to secure reference to viruses (so leaving a
reference-enabling role to be played by the scientist’s practices), it is not so easy
to suppose that the pilgrim’s minimal description of the object of her devotion
is not of itself sufficient to pick out God. After all, if the pilgrim thinks of God as
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‘ the creator’, for example, then this is already (assuming the truth of Christianity)
enough to pick out the Christian God. And in that case, why think that the
pilgrim’s practices have any part to play in securing the reference of her talk of
God? (And perhaps a similar objection can be raised in relation to the religious
analogue of the Kripke model. Why not suppose, for example, that the believer
can insert themselves into the relevant community by purely verbal means, as
when one says: ‘ I intend to refer to whatever was the ultimate object of such-and-
such a saint’s religious practice?’ And in that case, how might visiting the saint’s
body play a reference-enabling role?)
I suggest that two responses may be made to this objection. First of all, while
the pilgrimmay take her practices to be directed to the creator, she may also hold
various false beliefs about the creator, and if these false beliefs are sufficiently
pervasive, then a question may arise after all about whether she will succeed in
referring to God by description alone. A more interesting line of response might
allow that the pilgrim can achieve reference to God by description alone, but
suggest that pilgrimage offers a more religiously satisfying mode of reference.
There is perhaps an analogy here, once more, with the scientific case – an
enthusiast for science may have an adequate theoretical account of the nature of
viruses, but may still think it worthwhile to place themselves in an experimental
context where they can identify viruses by observing them or their effects with the
aid of relevant scientific apparatus. Analogously, the believer may take herself to
be able to refer to God abstractly, but may also wish to identify God in somemore
concrete fashion, by placing herself in proximity to artefacts, relics or places that
in some special way bear the marks of divine activity. In this case, the point of
pilgrimage is not just reference to God (that can be achieved otherwise) but
reference that is achieved by tangible means. The believer may intelligibly take
this sort of reference to God to be religiously more profound because it is
mediated by way of an encounter with the significance of the saint, and
thereby brings the believer into physical contact (rather than simply mental or
description-relative contact) with the power of God. Given the objection which
I attributed to Turner at the outset of this section, it is worth noting again that
achieving this kind of reference is not fundamentally a matter of having certain
conscious experiences, or of ‘seeing’ God, but depends rather upon standing in
the requisite relationship of physical proximity.
It would take some further work to develop these thoughts into a fully articu-
lated theory, but I hope I have said enough to suggest how pilgrimage practices,
far from implying an attachment to exalted experience (as Turner implies), and
far from being in tension with an apophatic understanding of God, can be read as
ways in which the believer’s thought and feeling are anchored in the Christian
God, precisely in the face of the idea that God is not immediately accessible in
experience, and the idea that our limited powers of description make reference to
God by thought alone a hazardous matter. Insofar as pilgrimage is defined both
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by the desire to stand in the ‘presence’ of figures of paradigmatic sanctity (rather
than ‘seeing’ God directly), and by the desire to achieve physical contact with
certain places or things (rather than simply to ‘think’), then it seems to lend itself
quite readily to some such reading.27
This account may also provide a further response to the first of our objections
to pilgrimage. For if pilgrimage can be understood in these terms, then far from
serving simply as an aid to recollection (where the object of recollection could in
principle be thought about anywhere), the pilgrim’s location at a particular site,
or in proximity to certain artefacts, may help to define the ultimate, divine con-
tent of their thinking – because a thought may depend for its reference upon the
thinker’s engagement with relevant artefacts (assuming here, once again, that the
Kripkean or scientific analogies that we have been exploring can be sustained).
Pilgrimage and omnipresence
So far we have reviewed two objections to pilgrimage practice. Perhaps
such practices (when they are not conceived simply as an aid to the imagination)
are rooted in a superstitious conception of divine activity – because they imply a
belief in law-suspending events of the kind postulated by orthodox pilgrims to
Jerusalem, or by Catholic pilgrims to sites such as Lourdes? Or, secondly, perhaps
pilgrimage practices imply that God can be encountered as a particular object of
experience, and perhaps therefore they are wedded to an experientialist and
sentimentalist account of the religious life?
I want now to consider one further objection, one to which I alluded at the
outset of this discussion. Perhaps, it will be said, pilgrimage practices are caught
up in a primitive, sub-Christian conception of God, because they are committed
to the idea of divine localizability?28 Of course, the idea of God as a particular
object of experience (the focus of the second of our objections) also involves a
notion of divine localizability (insofar as God is taken to be more directly present
to the believer in such experiences) ; but this kind of localizability need not imply
that God is tied especially to certain places (since such experiences may occur
anywhere, in principle), and it is this further issue that I want to examine here.
An objection rather like this one is implied in these lines of R. S. Thomas, where
he is reflecting upon his decision not to visit Kierkegaard’s grave.
What is it that drives a people
To the rejection of a great
Spirit, and after to think it returns
Reconciled to the shroud
Prepared for it? It is Luke’s Gospel
Warns us of the danger
Of scavenging among the dead
For the living – so I go
Up and down with him in his books,
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Hand and hand like a child
With its father, pausing to stare
As he did once at the mind’s country.29
Of course, there is a particular irony in supposing that Kierkegaard’s ‘spirit ’
might be preserved under a monument of ‘solid marble’ that expresses ‘the
heaviness of a nation’s respectability’ (as Thomas puts it). But a more
general point is made here: Jesus is alive, and in his resurrected state no longer
has a particular, localized body.30 And if that is so, then is it not pointless, if not
sacrilegious, to seek him out in particular places in Palestine? It is also implied
here that to encounter Jesus now is not least to enter ‘the mind’s country’, and to
think the thoughts that the gospels invite us to think.
This perspective is reminiscent of the attitude displayed by Hummel’s
nineteenth-century Anglican pilgrims – here again we find a desire to root our
connectedness to God in thought or the imagination, and a tendency to see the
religious significance of places as derivative from whatever importance they have
for thought. But there is another, more particular concern which we could take to
be expressed in the passage: surely Christians must think of God, and the
ascended Christ, as present equally in all places?31 And isn’t the kind of localiza-
tion of divine presence that is implied in pilgrimage therefore a deformation of
Christian understanding? Let me attempt a response to this proposal.
In the paper so far, I have tried to rebut two ways of understanding the sig-
nificance of pilgrimage practices in purely epistemic or experiential terms – their
significance is not, I have argued, simply a matter of the contribution that they
maymake to enabling a livelier recollection of biblical or other scenes; nor is their
significance to be understood simply, if at all, in terms of their role in enabling an
experience of divine encounter (nor, of course, is their significance given by some
combination of these accounts). One response to the objection we are currently
considering would appeal to the epistemic significance of particular places or
people: if God is made known with particular clarity in the lives of the saints (this
is a commonplace of the Christian tradition, I take it), then those lives have a
special significance, insofar as they have served as a vehicle of divine disclosure;
and something of that significance can then be communicated, in the ways we
have explored, to the post-mortem body of the saint; and in turn therefore that
significance can be ‘presented’ to the believer in relevant places in the present.
(Or analogously, to take the other case we have considered, we could argue that
certain events have a special revelatory significance, and the place which is the
site of those events will thereby acquire a special importance, which it can store
up over time.)
Our earlier analysis suggests that this sort of account should work well enough.
And this will provide one way of spelling out the idea of a differentiated divine
relationship to place: it is not that God is located more fully, or causally more
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present, in one place rather than another (so on this point, the objection we
are considering is accommodated); rather, the significance of certain people or
events which speak with special clarity of God can be ‘presented’ more fully
in certain places rather than others. This account is rooted in the idea that
ultimately the idea of differentiated divine relationship to place rests upon epis-
temic distinctions (the fact that some people or events communicate God more
clearly) – although if our earlier analysis holds, it is also true that pilgrimage
practices provide a mode of access to the relevant meanings which is not simply a
matter of the pilgrim imagining things they were otherwise unable to imagine, or
enjoying a special or elevated state of consciousness.
A more ambitious response to the objection we are considering would suppose
that God’s relationship to place is (also) differentiated because God is more
directly active, or at any rate active in ways which imply a different mode of
causality, in certain places. I want now to explore, rather briefly, one way of
developing this idea. This discussion will provide us with further opportunity to
think about bodies and their significance in this context, and once again my
approach will be free of any dependence upon the idea of law-suspending events.
I noted just now the idea that the ascended Christ does not have a localizable
body (or at any rate not a body that is localizable within our universe). But of
course, Christians have supposed that the members of the Church now make up,
in part, the body of Christ – and following this thought it may be supposed that
the saints in particular ‘embody’ Christ, in so far as they are directly responsive to
the will of God. To put the point in Richard Swinburne’s terms, the Church may
be said to be the body of Christ in ‘a far fuller sense than that in which the
inanimate world is God’s body’ because ‘not merely our bodies, but our wills and
feelings, are the vehicle of Christ, of his interaction with the world’.32 On this
account, then, God’s causal relationship to particular regions of space is differ-
entiated, in so far as only some regions of space can be counted as parts of
Christ’s body. If we can think of the significance of the saint in these terms, by
supposing that God’s causal relationship to the saint is of a different, and more
intimate, kind than his relationship to other pieces of matter (by analogy with the
kind of causal relationship that we enjoy with our bodies), then we could perhaps
suppose that the kind of significance that is the focus of pilgrimage practices may
in some cases flow from this truth concerning differences in the mode of divine
activity – without having to suppose that this distinctive kind of activity involves
any suspension of the laws of nature (or at any rate anymore of a suspension than
is implied in the normal operation of human free choice).
There is a further traditional Christian belief that is perhaps of some import-
ance here: namely the idea that at the general resurrection, a person’s body will
be comprised, at least in part, of the very matter that made up their body at the
time of death. If that is so, then we might suppose that there is a close analogy
between the post-mortem body of the saint and the body of the sleeping saint – in
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each case, the body is not currently active in the world, but in each case, we can
expect it to be active again.33 In so far as this analogy holds, then we might
suppose that God’s causal relationship to the body of the saint continues to be
distinctive even after the saint’s death – just as, by analogy, my causal relation-
ship to my body remains distinctive even while I am asleep, insofar as my body
remains, even during sleep, that portion of the world which I can act on with
particular directness. If this is so, then we can make further sense of Hunt’s ob-
servation that early Christian pilgrims supposed that their practices ‘transplanted
them… temporally backwards … into the presence of the sainted martyr’34 –
rather as we can be present to another person even while they are asleep.
In responding to the first two of our objections, we considered the thought
that pilgrimage practices need not be understood simply in imagination- or
experience-relative terms. And by reference to the idea of the Church as the body
of Christ, we might suppose that pilgrimage practices do not have to be grounded
in the idea that God bears a special relationship to certain places only insofar as
certain people and events serve to reveal God with special clarity (so here is a
further respect in which they do not have to be grounded in purely epistemic
considerations) – rather, the meanings which are presupposed in pilgrimage
may reflect the fact that God stands in a different, and more intimate, causal
relationship to certain regions of the world.35 Finally, by reference to the idea that
the bodies of the saints at the general resurrection will be at least in part identical
to their bodies at the time of death, we have been considering the idea that
the meanings which the pilgrim seeks to encounter when in the presence of the
post-mortem body need not rest simply upon a differentiated mode of divine
activity which obtained at some time in the past – even now, God’s causal
relationship to the saint’s body may be different, in so far as even now that body
can be considered part of the body of Christ.
Of course, this approach rests upon specifically Christian metaphysical as-
sumptions concerning the body of Christ, and the nature of the resurrection
body. Even so, the account fits with the general perspective that we have been
developing elsewhere in this essay, in so far as it does not ground the religious
significance of places by reference to law-suspending events (of the kind that
predate the eschaton). And again, these reflections provide a further reason for
supposing that the significance of pilgrimage practices cannot be understood
simply in experiential or epistemic terms.
Conclusion
Of course, there have been many objections to pilgrimage practices.
Famously, the Reformers were exercised by the association of pilgrimage with the
granting of indulgences, and more generally with the thought that divine favour
can in some fashion be earned. However, the idea of indulgences is likely to strike
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a modern audience as obviously muddle-headed or worse (not least when it
involves the idea that a precise exchange rate obtains between the benefits which
derive from visits to different places – as when it was supposed, for example, that
one visit to Rome was spiritually equivalent to two visits to Saint David’s in
Pembrokeshire.)36 In this paper, I have tried instead to pick out objections that
still have a degree of currency. Thinking of pilgrimage to Lourdes, for example,
it is not difficult to imagine someone objecting (as Richard Dawkins did in his
recent UK television series on religion) that this sort of activity rests upon a
superstitious belief in miracles of healing, or that it involves a kind of collective
loss of rationality, on account of the intense emotionality of such gatherings.37
And it is easy to imagine a Christian who supposes that God is encountered most
deeply in a person’s private experience of prayer concluding that pilgrimage
involves a sub-Christian notion of divine localizability (since such experiences
can occur in principle anywhere). So the objections I have taken are all, I think,
live in the context of current debate.
In this paper, I have not wanted to address directly the presuppositions of
these objections (I have ventured no view, for example, on whether accounts of
miraculous healings at Lourdes are to be believed). But I have tried to sketch an
account of pilgrimage which shows how such practices can have a point quite
apart from any belief in natural-law-suspending events, and quite apart from any
tendency they may have to engender especially intense forms of religious
experience, and how they need not depend upon the idea that God is, from a
causal point of view, more directly and enduringly present in certain places than
others – although on this last point, I have also argued, of course, that on a
Christian perspective, there is some reason to think that God’s causal relationship
to places is differentiated (quite apart from any commitment to the idea that God
works ‘miraculously’), and that this differentiation may help to underpin the
point of certain pilgrimage practices.
Overall, the case I have been making seeks to show, with particular reference to
the case of pilgrimage, how we canmake sense of the idea that certain places may
be of special importance religiously, and how this differentiation of place need
not be mediated simply by way of our imagination or experience, or even by
reference to the contribution of certain people or events in revealing God with
special clarity. In place of these accounts, I have been considering (first) how
bodies and places may store up significance over time – a significance that may
(but need not) derive from a differentiated mode of divine causality – and how
religious meanings may thereby be ‘presented’ to the pilgrim via the relationship
of physical proximity; and (second) how by handling religious artefacts, or in
general by standing in a relationship of physical proximity to certain places, the
believer can locate themselves physically within the Christian tradition, and
thereby achieve an embodied reference to the Christian God. In both of these
respects, then, we have been considering how relationship to God may be
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mediated not simply by thought (or by imagination, experience and description),
but by location. Naturally, I do not want to say that these two perspectives
exhaust the range of licit meanings of pilgrimage. But I do hope to have shown
that pilgrimage is a richer and more suggestive phenomenon than one might
suppose from reading standard accounts – whether those accounts derive from
would-be friends of the practice or from its detractors.38
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